Showing posts with label wonderful company at fair price. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wonderful company at fair price. Show all posts

To make sure every $1 investment will generate $2000 in just 30 years ...

Fundamental analysts can have good dreams because they usually sleep well. If you are one of them, you don’t have to be afraid of daily stock price fluctuations. Why care so much for $1 to $2 per day price movements and uncertainties when you can get $100,000 30 years later almost certainly and do nothing? The ‘do nothing’ is what makes you an investor. Don’t you think so? Once you bought the shares, you will only sell them if there are fundamental changes; such as change in management or business model. Otherwise, continue riding on their profits and keep on collecting dividends or bonus issues by ‘doing nothing’.

Doesn’t it sound so peaceful?


"To make sure every $1 investment will generate $2000 in just 30 years, make sure you buy the stock at the lowest price possible."

Valuing a Business

"The critical investment factor is determining the intrinsic value of a business and paying a fair or bargain price."

- Warren Buffett

If you find a good company at a good price, who cares what "the market" is doing?


When buying a great wonderful company, also ensure that the stock was reasonably priced.
Even a great company can be a bad investment if you pay too much for it. 

If you find a good company at a good price, who cares what "the market" is doing?

Nestle revisited


In the year 2001, the after tax EPS of Nestle was 87 sen. and its share price was trading between $19.30 to $21.20, with a P/E ranging from 22.2 to 24.4.

For someone who bought Nestle in 2001, where was the margin of safety of this company?

Margin of safety in a company comes from various sources.  Among these are the qualitative factors which are difficult to quantify mathematically.  Nestle has durable competitive advantage and economic moat.  The only assessment for the investor is to "guess intelligently" what its earnings growth will be over the next few years.  

Margin of safety concept can be applied in two ways.  One that is obvious is buying a company at a big discount to its intrinsic value.  Of course, intrinsic value is not easy to determine and does vary widely depending on the assumptions one makes in deriving this value.  Another method that is not obvious, is the margin of safety that exists too when the present price that you are paying is at a discount to its intrinsic value based on its growth projections, conservatively estimated.

Let's look at Nestle.  In 2001, you were paying 22.2 times for $1 of its after tax earnings.  Was this underpriced, fair price or overpriced relative to its intrinsic value, conservatively estimated based on its growth potential?  Growth projections are at best intelligent guesstimates.  Nestle was projected to grow its business profit at 8% per year at that time.  Therefore in 9 years from 2001, it was projected then to have an EPS of 2 x 87 sen = 174 sen.  

Assuming that Nestle in 2010 had the same PE of 22.2, its share price in 2010 should be 22.2 x 174 sen = $.38.63, or CAGR of 8%.  The average DY of Nestle was 4%.  Nestle paid out virtually all its earnings as dividends.  Therefore, its DY in 2001 based on historical cost was 4% but in 2010, its DY based on historical cost was 8% (dividend paid had also doubled).  This was an average dividend yield of about 6% per year for that period.  Should you have reinvested all the dividends back into Nestle, you would probably be able to compound your initial investment at more than 14% per year.

So, in 2001, Nestle's PE was 22.2x.  Yet, knowing its earning growth potential, conservatively estimated, there was margin of safety even buying at this price, with a reasonable degree of probability.  Using a conservative growth estimate in earnings of 8% per year, its earnings was projected to double in 2010.  Based on this EPS projection, its (future) intrinsic value would be higher and herein was the margin of safety demanded by the value investor.  

Such way of investing may not appeal to some investors.  It is too difficult for them to realise that growth creates value.  One should be happy to pay a higher PE to own a stock of higher quality, better earnings growth, lesser risk and greater certainty of a positive sustainable return.

Buying a wonderful company at a fair price has made those who know how, very rewarding and rich indeed.  There is no reason to change something that has worked consistently over 2 decades of investing.  


Warren Buffett: About Socks and Stocks


About Socks and Stocks

"Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that 'Price is what you pay; value is what you get.' Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down."


Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/warren-buffett-quotes-on-investing-2010-8?op=1#ixzz1oXHwI5c2

Warren Buffett: Wonderful v Fair

"It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price."

Wonderful v Fair
Source: Letter to shareholders, 1989


Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/warren-buffett-quotes-on-investing-2010-8?op=1#ixzz1oXDD3b9D

Buffett's Big 4 Investments in Marketable Securities - American Express, Coca Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo


-  Finally, we made two major investments in marketable securities:

  • (1) a $5 billion 6% preferred stock of Bank of America that came with warrants allowing us to buy 700 million common shares at $7.14 per share any time before September 2, 2021; and 
  • (2) 63.9 million shares of IBM that cost us $10.9 billion. 
Counting IBM, we now have large ownership interests in four exceptional companies:

  • 13.0% of American Express, 
  • 8.8% of Coca-Cola, 
  • 5.5% of IBM and 
  • 7.6% of Wells Fargo. 
  • (We also, of course, have many smaller, but important, positions.)


Comment:  "Buying wonderful company at fair price" and "holding period is forever".   This is classically Buffett's style.


We view these holdings as partnership interests in wonderful businesses, not as marketable securities to be bought or sold based on their near-term prospects. Our share of their earnings, however, are far from fully reflected in our earnings; only the dividends we receive from these businesses show up in our financial reports. Over time, though, the undistributed earnings of these companies that are attributable to our ownership are of huge importance to us. That’s because they will be used in a variety of ways to increase future earnings and dividends of the investee. They may also be devoted to stock repurchases, which will increase our share of the company’s future earnings.

Comment:  Buffett buys and holds for the long term.  He keeps these companies for their long-term prospects, knowing that he will obtain good returns from these companies, either through the dividends they distribute or through the undistributed growing earnings attributable to the owners from its reinvested retained earnings.


-  Had we owned our present positions throughout last year, our dividends from the “Big Four” would have been $862 million. That’s all that would have been reported in Berkshire’s income statement. Our share of this quartet’s earnings, however, would have been far greater: $3.3 billion. Charlie and I believe that the $2.4 billion that goes unreported on our books creates at least that amount of value for Berkshire as it fuels earnings gains in future years. We expect the combined earnings of the four – and their dividends as well – to increase in 2012 and, for that matter, almost every year for a long time to come. A decade from now, our current holdings of the four companies might well account for earnings of $7 billion, of which $2 billion in dividends would come to us.


Comment:  Only the dividends received are reported in Berkshire Hathaways account.  This is only a fraction (36%) of the actual earnings of $3.3 billion.  Buffett opines that these dividends will continue to grow as the retained earnings fuel earnings gains in future years.  I like the way Buffett projects the future earnings of these companies.

  • For present earnings of $3 billion to grow to $7 billion in 10 years, he is projecting a CAG of 8.84%.  
  • Projecting the dividends of $862 million growing to $2 billion in a decade is the equivalent of the dividends growing at a CAG of  8.77% for the same period.  
  • The growth rates used in his projections are very conservative (8.84% and 8.77%).  Maybe Buffett just uses his simple rule of thumb of doubling the earnings or dividends every 10 years.
  • Once again, he reiterates that $1 retained earnings by the company should deliver at least $1 value to the shareholder.

What is Warren Buffett's investing philosophy?

Buffett's investment philosophy has changed over time and can generally be thought of in two parts:


  • Early Buffett (pre-1970): buy at a significant discount to intrinsic value. "Fair business at a wonderful price."
  • Late Buffett (post-1970): buy companies at a price at or near intrinsic value, that can consistently increase their intrinsic value,.  "Wonderful business at a fair price."

He has said that the latter philosophy is far superior to the former and that it took him far too long to realize it.  Buffett's investment philosophy certainly evolved over the course of his investing lifetime, and did shift towards more of a focus on quality rather than cheapness, in part due to his association with and learning from his business partner Charlie Munger.  The intellectual father - the "Benjamin Graham," if you will - of this quality focus was Phil Fisher.  Generally, Buffett is a value investor; he studied under and worked for Benjamin Graham, the author of The Intelligent Investor and Security Analysis and the man generally considered the father of modern-day value investing, and credits Graham for much of his investment philosophy and success.


The best way to truly understand Buffett's investment philosophy is to read the following (links below):
1. His letters to investors from his early investment partnerships
2. His letters to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway
3. The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham
4. Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits by Phil Fisher


Early Partnership Letters (1959-1969):

Berkshire Hathaway Letters (1977-2010):


Intelligent Investor:


Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits:

http://www.quora.com/Warren-Buffett/What-is-Warren-Buffetts-investing-philosophy